b. If John buys a car, he checks the motor rst. c. If Spaceman Spi lands on planet X, he will be annoyed by the fact that his weight is higher than it would be on earth. (Beaver 1995 ) Example (1.a) contains a de nite description, \his wife", which triggers the presupposition that John has a wife. For the correct treatment of this example, a rather trivial piece of world knowledge is needed: if a man is married, he has a wife. But, if we do not take this piece of world knowledge into account, the theory of Van der Sandt (1992) is not able to treat being \married" as an`antecedent' for the presupposition triggered by \his wife". Being married creates an (implied) antecedent for \his wife". A more substantial usage of world knowledge is required for example (1.b), which i s a n e x a m p l e of the notorious bridging phenomenon (Clark 1975) . The description \the motor" presupposes the existence of a motor. Since there is no proper antecedent for this de nite description, the theory of Van der Sandt (1992) predicts that the presupposition is accommodated. But this fails to do justice to the intuition that the mentioning of a car somehow licenses the use of \the motor" and that the motor is part of the car which John buys. Example (1.c) also illustrates the need for world knowledge. The \the fact that S" construction presupposes S t h us the consequent of (1.c) presupposes that Spaceman Spi 's weight is higher than it would be on earth. Since there is no obvious way to bind this presupposition, Van der Sandt's account predicts that it is accommodated.
The claim that world knowledge has an in uence on presupposition projection is hardly revolutionary. For instance, Van der Sandt seems to assume that world knowledge somehow in uences presupposition projection (Van der Sandt 1992:375, fn. 20) , but he gives no clues on how world knowledge interacts with his theory of presupposition. The central question addressed in this chapter is how to account for the in uence of world knowledge on presup-positionprojection. We argue that employing a class of mathematical formalisms known as Constructive Type Theories (CTT, see e.g., Martin-L of 1984 , Barendregt 1992 ) allows us to answer this question. To d o s o , w e reformulate Van der Sandt's theory in terms of CTT. CTT di ers from other proof systems in that for each proposition which i s p r o ven, CTT also delivers a proof-object which shows how the proposition was proven. 1 As we shall see, the presence of these proof-objects is useful from the presuppositional point of view. Additionally, CTT contexts contain more information than is conveyed by the ongoing discourse, and there is a formal interaction between this`background knowledge' and the representation of the current discourse. This means that the reformulation of Van der Sandt's theory in terms of CTT is not just a nice technical exercise, but actually creates interesting new possibilities where the interaction between presupposition resolution and world knowledge is concerned. 2 2 Presuppositions as Anaphors Van der Sandt (1992) proposes to resolve presuppositions, just like anaphoric pronouns are resolved in DRT. For this purpose he develops a meta-level resolution algorithm. The input of this algorithm is an underspeci ed Discourse Representation Structure 1 For us, the constructive aspect resides in the explicit construction of proofobjects we are not committed to an underlying intuitionistic logic.
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In spirit, our work is related to Ahn (1994) , Beun & Kievit (1995) and Krause (1995) . Krause presents a type-theoretical approach to presuppositions. His system not only allows binding of presuppositions, but also has the possibility to globally accommodate them using an abductive inferencing mechanism. One important di erence with our approach is that we t a k e the entire theory of Van der Sandt (including intermediate and local accommodation) and rephrase it in terms of CTT. Ahn and Beun & Kievit use CTT for dealing with the resolution of de nite expressions. The latter focus on selecting the right referent (which m a y be found in the linguistic context, but also in the physical context) using concepts such as prominence and agreement.
(DRS), which contains one or more unresolved presuppositions. When all these presuppositions have been resolved, a proper DRS remains, which can be interpreted in the standard way. 3 Consider (2), and its Van der Sandtian representation, (drs 1): (2) If a Chihuahua enters the room, the dog snarls.
(drs 1)
The de nite description the dog presupposes the existence of a dog. Van der Sandt models this by adding an embedded, presuppositional DRS to the representation of the consequent (expressing that there is a dog). To resolve the presuppositional DRS, we d o what we w ould do to resolve a pronoun: look for a suitable, accessible antecedent. In this case, we n d o n e : the discourse referent x introduced in the antecedent is accessible, and suitable since a Chihuahua is a dog. As said above, it is unclear how this information can be employed in Van der Sandt's theory, but for now l e t u s simply assume that we can bind the presupposition. The presuppositional DRS is removed, and the y in the condition snarl(y) i s replaced with the newly found antecedent: x.
(drs 2)
In Krahmer (1995) , Van der Sandt's theory is combined with a version of DRT w i t h a partial interpretation. In this way, DRSs which contain unresolved presuppositions can also be interpreted, which i s s h o wn to have s e v eral advantages.
Anaphoric pronouns need to be bound. For presuppositions this is di erent: they can also be accommodated, provided the presupposition contains su cient descriptive c o n tent. Reconsider example (2): on Van der Sandt's approach (globally) accommodating the presupposition associated with the dog amounts to removing the presuppositional DRS from the consequent DRS and placing it in the main DRS, with (drs 3) as result.
This DRS represents the`presuppositional' reading of (2), which may be paraphrased as \there is a dog and if a Chihuahua enters, the aforementioned dog snarls". 4 Now we have two ways of dealing with the presupposition in example (2), so the question may arise which of these two is the`best' one. To answer that question, Van der Sandt (1992:357) gives some general rules for preferences, which may beput informally as follows: 1. Binding is preferred over accommodation, 2. Accommodation is preferred as high as possible, 3. Binding is preferred as low as possible. Thus: according to Van der Sandt (drs 2) (the`binding' reading) is preferred over (drs 3) (the`accommodation' reading). 5 The second preference rule suggests that there is more than one way to accommodate a presupposition, and indeed there is. Consider: 4 This DRS (as the previous ones) are presented in the usual`pictorial' fashion. Below we also use a linear notation which we trust to be selfexplanatory. For example, in this linear notation the current DRS looks as follows: yj dog(y) x j Chihuahua(x) enter(x)] =) jsnarl(y)]] .
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It has been argued that examples like (2), in which there is a partial match between anaphor and antecedent are ambiguous between a binding and an accommodation reading. See e.g., Krahmer & Van Deemter (1997) for an analysis of partial match a m biguities. Here we will ignore this issue.
(3) It is not true that I feed John's Chihuahua, since he doesn't have one!
Here global accommodation of the presupposition triggered by John's Chihuahua yields an inconsistent DRS. This is prohibited by one of Van der Sandt (1992:367) 's conditions on accommodation. Therefore the presupposition is accommodated locally, i.e., within the scope of the negation.
In the next section, we discuss CTT and show how Van der Sandt's approach can berephrased in terms of it. In the Section thereafter, we will see how the examples in (1), which are problematic for Van der Sandt's approach as it stands, can bedealt with. We believe that the CTT approach leads to better results than adding a proof-system to DRT, as done in e.g., Saurer (1993) . The main advantage of CTT is that it is a standard proof system developed in mathematics with well-understood meta-theoretical properties (see Ahn & Kolb (1990) for discussion on the advantages of reformulating DRT in CTT). Moreover, the presence of explicit proof-objects turns out to have some additional advantages for our present purposes.
The Deductive Perspective
We introduce CTT by comparing it with DRT this comparison is based on Ahn & Kolb (1990) A discourse referent can be modelled in CTT as a variable. A referent is added to the context by means of an introduction which not only adds the variable but also xes its type. We c hoose entity as the type of discourse referents. Thus, we add x : entity to the context. entity itself also requires introduction. Since entity is a type, we w r i t e : entity:type.
In general, a type T can only be used after the type of T itself (or the parts of which T has beencomposed) has beenspeci ed in the context with an introduction (e.g., T : T 0 ). However, the introduction of the aforementioned type type is not carried out in the context it is taken care of by an axiom which s a ys that type:2 (where 2 is to be understood as the`mother' of all types) can be derived in the empty c o n text ( `type:2).
DRT's conditions correspond to introductions V : T, where T is of the type prop (short for proposition, which comes with the following axiom: `prop : 2). For instance, the introduction y : ( dog x) corresponds to the condition dog(x). The type dog x (of type prop) is obtained by applying the type dog to the object x. Therefore, it depends on the introductions of x and dog. Since dog x should be of the type prop, dog must bea(function) type from the set of entities into propositions, i.e., dog:entity ! prop.
The introduction y :dog x involves the variable y (of the type dog x). The variable y is said to be an inhabitant of dog x. Curry and Feys (1958) came up with the idea that propositions can be seen as classifying proofs (this is known as the propositions as types { proofs as objects interpretation). This means that the aforementioned introduction states that there is a proof y for the proposition dog x. The second condition of (4.b), snarl(x), can be dealt with along the same lines (this yields z :snarl x). Thus, the CTT counterpart to the DRS (4.b) contains the following three introductions: x:entity y:dog x z :snarl x. Dependent F unction Types In DRT, the proposition \Every-thing sucks" is translated into A DRS containing the implicative condition x j thing(x)] =) j suck(x)]. In CTT, this proposition corresponds to the type ( x:entity:suck x), which is a dependent function type. It describes functions from the type entity into the type suck x. The range of such a function (suck x) depends on the object x to which it is applied. Suppose that we have an inhabitant f of this function type, i.e., f : ( x : entity:suck x).
Then we h a ve a function which, when it is applied to an arbitrary object y, yields an inhabitant o f the proposition suck y. Thus, f is a constructive proof for the proposition that Everything sucks.
Of course, function types can benested. Consider the predicate \snarl". We suggested to introduce it as a function from entities to propositions. One could, however, argue that \snarl" is a predicate which only applies to dogs. In that case, it would have t o b e i n troduced as a function from entities to another function, i.e., the function from a proof that the entity is a dog to a proposition, that is snarl: ( x:entity:( p:dog x:prop)). We will abbreviate this as snarl: ( x:entity p:dog x] ) prop).
Inference The core of CTT consists of a set of derivation rules with which one can determine the type of an object in a given context. These rules are also suited for searching for an object belonging to a particular type. There is, for instance, a rule which is similar to modus ponens in propositional logic (in the rule below, T x := a] stands for a T such that all free occurrences of x in T have been substituted by a. Furthermore, ;`E :T means that in context ;, the statement E :T holds):
;`F : ( x:A:B) ;`a:A ;`F a:B x := a] For instance, if a context ; contains the introductions b : entity and g : ( y : entity:suck y) (Everything sucks), then we can use this rule to nd an inhabitant of the type suck b. In other words, our goal is to nd a substitution S such t h a t ; P :suck b S]. The substitution S should assign a value to P. P is a so-called gap. A CTT expression with a gap is an underspeci ed representation of a proper CTT expression: if the gap is lled, then a proper CTT expression is obtained. The deduction rule tells us that (g b) can be substituted for P, if ;`g : ( y : entity:suck y) and ;`b : entity. Both so-called judgements are valid, because we assumed that g : ( y :entity:suck y) a n d b:entity are membersof ;. Thus, we can conclude that ;`(g b) : suck b.
Presuppositions as Gaps A DRS is the end product of the interpretation of a sentence with respect to a main DRS. Ahn & Kolb (1990) show that this end product can be translated into a corresponding CTT context. Van We assume that one sentence translates into one type. The attentive reader may w onder how t h i s agrees with our earlier translation of (4.a). In fact, it corresponds to the following single introduction: g : ( x : entity:( y : dog x:snarl x)), given some appropriate, standard derivation rules (e.g., Martin-L of 1984 , Ranta 1994 Recall that this abbreviates x : entity:( y : chihuahua x:( z : enters x:(snarl Y Y :entity P:dog Y ] ))).
Thus, if x is an entity, y is a proof that x is a Chihuahua and z is a proof that x enters, then there exists a proof that Y snarls, where Y is a gap to be lled by a n e n tity for which w e c a n p r o ve that it is a dog. 8 The presuppositional annotation consists of a sequence of introductions with gaps. 9 Filling the Gaps Before we c a n e v aluate the CTT representation (5) given some context ;, we r s t h a ve to resolve the presupposition by lling the gaps. For this purpose, we have developed an algorithm (sketched in the appendix) which can beseen as a re-implementation of Van der Sandt's resolution algorithm, but now operating on CTT expressions. The rst thing we do after starting the resolution process, is try to ll the gap by`binding' it. The question whether we can bind the presupposition triggered by \the dog" in example (2) can be phrased in CTT as follows: is 8 The notion of gaps can also be applied to the analysis of questions in CTT (Piwek 1997) . A question introduces gaps, which can be lled by extending the context of interpretation with the answer provided by the dialogue participant. A question is answered, when the associated gaps can be lled. A :== T G : T G j A A P T :== T G j P T A j ( V : PT:PT) j ( V : P T : P T ) j (P T P T ) P Q represents the concatenation of sequences P and Q (often written as P Q). Notice that the de nition permits annotation of expressions which are already annotated. This is required for representing embedded presuppositions.
there a substitution S such that the following can be proven? 10,11 (6) ; x :entity y:chihuahua x z :enter x` (Y :entity P :dog Y ) S]
In words: is it possible to prove the existence of a dog from the global context ; extended with the local context (the antecedent of the conditional)? The answer is: that depends on ;. Suppose for the sake of argument that ; itself does not introduce any dogs, but that it does contain the information that a Chihuahua is a dog. Technically, this means that (7) is a memberof;:
(7) f : ( a:entity b:chihuahua a] ) (dog a))
Given this function, we nd a substitution S for (6), mapping Y to x and P to (f x y) (which is the result of applying the aforementioned function f to x and y). 12 So we ll the gaps using the substitution S, r e m o ve the annotations (which h a ve done their job) and continue with the result:
(8) x:entity y:chihuahua x z :enter x] ) (snarl x) Thus, intuitively, if an interpreter knows that a Chihuahua is a dog, she will be able to bind the presupposition triggered by the de nite \the dog" in (2). Now suppose the interpreter does not know that a Chihuahua is a dog or is of the opinion that Chihuahuas simply are not`proper' dogs. That is, ; does not contain a function mapping Chihuahuas to dogs. Then, still under the assumption that ; does not introduce any dogs, the interpreter will not beable to prove the existence of a dog. She can then try to 10 In general: ;` C1 : : : C n abbreviates ;`C1, : : : , ; Cn. . Of course, it has to be checked whether this move is adequate, whether the result of accommodation is consistent and informative. 13 For more details on the resolution algorithm (also of intermediate 14 and { our alternative f o r { l o c a l accommodation) the reader is referred to the appendix.
Using World Knowledge
Bridging From our perspective, bridging amounts to using world knowledge to ll gaps. Consider example (1.b) again, with its CTT representation given in (9). (9) For more information of the background and formalization of these constraints see Van der Sandt (1992:367-369 ). 14 Intermediate accommodation is not entirely uncontroversial. For instance, it has been argued that the`intermediate readings' are achieved in a di erent way, e.g., by q u a n ti cational restriction (see e.g., Beaver 1995).
(motor (f a b) ). Using these two functions, we nd a substitution S in (10), mapping Y to f x y and P to g x y. We can look at the resulting proof-objects as the`bridge' which has been constructed by t h e i n terpreter it makes the link with the introduction of a car explicit (by using x and y) and indicates which inference steps the user had to make to establish the connection with the motor (by using the functions f and g). So, we can ll the gaps, assuming that the proofs satisfy certain conditions. Of course, they have to satisfy the usual Van der Sandt conditions. Additionally, the bridge itself has to be`plausible'. What plausibility exactly is, is beyond the scope of this chapter (but see Section 5). We w ould like to point out, however, that the presence in CTT of explicit proofobjects indicating precisely which pieces of knowledge have been used, facilitates plausibility-checking. For example, we contend that the complexity of the proof-object is inversely proportional to the plausibility of the bridge. 15 Let us now consider a somewhat more complex example.
(11) John walked into the room. The chandelier shone brightly.
(after Clark 1975) Assume that the rst sentence of (11) For a given proof-object we can determine which atomic proof-objects from the context have been used and how m a n y times. Thus, in the aforementioned f x y three atomic proofs are used, namely f, x and y.
she had some piece of knowledge to the e ect that every room has a chandelier (if her ; would contain functions which for each room produce a chandelier). However, such knowledge is hardly realistic many rooms do not have a c handelier.
In a more realistic scenario, the following might happen. The interpreter tries to prove the existence of a chandelier, but fails to do so. However, she knows that a chandelier is a kind of lamp and the existence of a lamp can be proven using the room just mentioned and the background knowledge that rooms have lamps. Formally, and analogous to the motor-example, ; contains one function which produces an entity for each room f : ( a:entity b: room a] ) entity), and one which states that this entity is a lamp g: ( a:entity b:room a] ) (lamp (f a b))). Since the speaker has uttered (11) the interpreter will assume that (one of) the lamp(s) in the room is a chandelier. 16 In terms of the CTT approach: the interpreter infers that the room which J o h n e n tered contains an entity which is a lamp (applying the aforementioned piece of knowledge the functions f and g), and then binds part of the presupposition by lling the Y gap with f x y (the inferred lamp).
The remaining part of the presupposition (that the lamp is in fact a c handelier) is now accommodated in the usual way b y lling the P gap with a fresh variable. 17,18 16 Notice that according to this picture both the anaphor and the antecedent play a role in constructing the bridge (see, for instance, Milward 1996) .
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Where does bridging t in with Van der Sandt's preference hierarchy? We hypothesize that rule 1, mentioned in Section 2, should be restated as, 1.a Binding to a non-inferred antecedent is preferred to accommodation, and 1.b Binding to a non-inferred antecedent is preferred to binding to an inferred antecedent. Whether binding to an implied antecedent is preferred over accommodation or vice versa cannot be stated in a general way: this again depends on the`plausibility'.
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It has been observed that binding a pronominal anaphor to an implied antecedent i s generally impossible. This follows from our present approach: the descriptive content of a pronoun is so small, that there will in general be many inferred objects meeting what little descriptive content there is, thus Summarizing: if the`bridge' between would-be anaphor and would-be antecedent is fully derivable using world knowledge, the presupposition can be bound. Thus, binding plays a more substantial rôle than in Van der Sandt's original theory, as presuppositions can be bound to both inferred and non-inferred antecedents. On the other hand, if the`bridge' between anaphor and antecedent is not fully derivable, the`missing link' will be accommodated. So, accommodation is still a repair-strategy, a s i n V an der Sandt's original approach, but now there is generally less to repair. In most cases, accommodation will amount to`assuming' a more speci c description of a deduced object (in this case, that the lamp whose existence has been proven is actually a chandelier). 19 Notice, -nally, that our approach to bridging is deliberately not lexical. 20 (13) Yesterday somebody parked a car in front of my door, and the dog howled awfully. This example can beunderstood in a bridging-manner given thè right' background knowledge. Suppose, it is well known between resulting in an`unresolvable ambiguity'. Notice that this approach does not preclude that sometimes a pronoun can refer back to a inferred antecedent. Consider: \Did you hear that John nally is going to get married? She must be very rich". In such cases, one implied antecedent (`John's future wife') seems to be more prominent than all others.
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In this respect our approach to bridging is comparable to the one advocated in Hobbs (1987) and, in particular, in Hobbs et al. (1993) . One important di erence between our approach and theirs is that we t a k e the presuppositionhood of the bridging anaphor as one of the central characteristics. This separation of presupposed and asserted material enables us to resolve bridging anaphors even in cases where the asserted material is inconsistent with the context. A similar point is made in Asher & Lascarides (1996:19) , who argue that rhetorical relations are an important factor for processing bridging NPs.
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As opposed to e.g., Bos, Buitelaar & Mineur (1995) , where bridging is analyzed by the addition of qualia-structures to Van der Sandt's presupposition theory. As Bos, Buitelaar & Mineur put it, a qualia-structure can be seen as a set of lexical entailments. Our main objection to this approach is that not all implied antecedents are lexical entailments, as example (13) illustrates. the speaker and the interpreter that the former lives opposite a dog hotel somewhere in the countryside, and all the cars which s t o p i n front of this hotel (and hence in front of the speaker's door) either drop a dog or pick one up. In this context, the hearer will have n o trouble constructing the required bridge (since she has a mental function which produces a dog for each car stopping in front of the speaker's door). For more examples, we refer to Krahmer & Piwek (1997) .
Conditionals and Presuppositions One attractive feature of the CTT view on discourse is that we get`discourse markers' for propositions for free. This is useful, for instance, in the case of propositional presuppositions, of which the fact that S construction is an example (cf. (1.c) ). According to Stalnaker (1974) , a proposition which is presupposed should be part of the context (common background). In terms of CTT, this means that a proof for the proposition should be derivable in the context. The latter interpretation agrees nicely with the dictum of presuppositions as anaphors: the proof of the proposition acts as the required antecedent (cf., Ranta 1994) .
In order to make this idea more precise, let us give the proto type for example (1.c). For the sake of simplicity we treat \an-noyed by the fact that" as a (complex) predicate: annoyed is a function which applied to a person, a proposition and a proof for the proposition yields a new proposition, annoyed : x : entity q : prop r:q] ) prop: (14) p:land sp plx] ) (annoyed sp (weigth higher sp) P) P:weight higher sp]
The basic structure of this proto type is ) . 21 The algorithm sketched in the appendix proceeds as follows. It rst tries
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This proto type contains some simpli cations: the meaning of some parts of the sentence has not been analysed to the fullest detail: we stipu-to bind the presupposition, in the context of ; extended with (the conditional's antecedent). In this case, seems to provide no proper antecedent for the presupposition. World knowledge can, however, change the picture dramatically. Suppose that the interpreter knows that: \if something lands on planet X, then its weight will be higher than it would be on earth", formally f : ( x : entity q : land x plx] ) weight higher x). In that case, the presupposition can be bound. The appropriate substitution for the presupposition P, namely f sp p, is obtained by using world knowledge and the information given in the conditional's antecedent. Now, suppose there is not su cient information in the context to nd a binder for the presupposition. Then some piece of information will have to beaccommodated. First, the algorithm attempts to globally accommodate the presupposition. This results in a rather awkward reading, paraphrasable as \Spaceman Spi 's weight is higher than it would be on earth, and if he lands on planet X, it will bother him (that his weight is higher than it would be o n e arth)". Beaver explains this awkwardness by pointing out that the sentence will typically be uttered in a situation where Spi is hanging somewhere in space. Most of us know that in space one is weightless. So for the average interpreter, global accommodation of \Spi 's weight is higher than it would be on earth" can be blocked: adding this proposition to a context containing the information that Spi is weightless will enable the interpreter to derive an inconsistency (given some other fairly common pieces of information, e.g.,`on earth one is not weightless').
If global accommodation is ruled out, there are two possibilities left: intermediate and local accommodation. Here, let us consider the reading involving local accommodation (cf. footnote 14). We late that \Spi 's weight is higher than it would be o n e arth" corresponds to weighthigher sp. Additionally, some presuppositions are already resolved: \Spi " to the variable sp and \planet X" to plx.
model Van der Sandt's local accommodation as follows: given a CTT expression of the form ) (as (14)), the algorithm adds ) to the global context, i.e.: we model local accommodation as global accommodation of a conditional presupposition. 22 
Conclusions
We rephrased Van der Sandt's presuppositions as anaphors theory in terms of CTT, and showed that this facilitates the formal interaction between world knowledge and presupposition projection. To illustrate this interaction, we applied the CTT version of the presuppositions as anaphors approach to Clark's bridging cases and Beaver's conditional presuppositions. These phenomena, which are beyond the scope of theory presented in Van der Sandt (1992) , could be dealt with in a straightforward fashion. An important factor in our analyses is the presence of explicit proof objects, which is one of the characteristic properties of CTT.
There are, however, still a lot of open questions. When is bridge a illformed? Why do listeners prefer one bridge over another? And, why should a listener construct a bridge in the rst place? In fact, Clark (1975) already provided part of the answers to these questions. For example, he noted that bridging is a determinate process, which has to satisfy certain criteria. Among
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The advantage of this alternative can be illustrated using another example from Beaver (1995) : \It is unlikely that if Spaceman Spi lands on planet X, he will be annoyed by the fact that his weight is higher than it would be o n e arth.". Van der Sandt's local accommodation produces the following interpretation for this sentence: \It is unlikely that if Spaceman Spi lands on planet X, his weight will be higher than it would be o n e arth and he will be annoyed b y t h i s fact". Beaver (1995) remarks that Van der Sandt's reading does not entail that \if Spaceman Spi lands on planet X, his weight will be higher than it would be o n e arth" (it even suggest the opposite), whereas it intuitively should. According to our re-de nition of local accommodation the latter sentence does follow from the (adjusted) global context. other things, Clark proposes a general stopping rule which essentially says that listeners build the shortest possible bridge that is consistent with the context. In Krahmer & Piwek (in prep.) it is argued that the CTT perspective can account for this constraint, as well as`softer' constraints having to do with relevance and plausibility, in an elegant manner as conditions on proof-objects.
A The Resolution Algorithm
Let be the CTT representation of the current utterance, and ; the current global context. The following algorithm, written in Pseudo PRO-LOG, tells us how to resolve the presuppositions of (if any) in the context of ;. C i s a v ariable representing the relevant context, consisting of the ; extended with temporary assumptions (e.g., antecedents of conditionals). Initially, C is set equal to ; (i.e., C := ;). The basic c l a u s e g o e s a s f o l l o ws:
If is atomic, i.e., not of the form V : : (also abbreviated as V : ] )
) and not containing presuppositional annotations, then the resolution of in the context of C is . Here is the recursive clause, which deals with -expressions ( stands for concatenation). Where binder is de ned as follows: binder( C S ) : -S 2 fS jC` S ]g preferred(S). When there is more than one possible binding, it is determined which i s t h e most preferred one (where preference is dened in terms of the numberofintervening introductions, the complexity of proof-objects, etc.). If there are two equally preferred bindings, an unresolvable ambiguity results. If there is no`binder' for a presupposition, we t r y t o globally accommodate it. Here and elsewhere S 0 is the assignment w h i c h maps any gaps in to ;-fresh variables of the right t ype. Thus: if it is possible to accommodate the presupposition, then we m a y add it to the context ;, and go on resolving any remaining presuppositions in with respect to the new, extended context. adequate checks whether the result of accommodation in a given context meets the Van der Sandtian conditions, i.e., is 23 ; ; C gives those introductions which are present in ; but not in C, i . e . , have been added to the global context ; since the beginning of resolution. 24 V : 0 is temporarily added (`assumed') to the context in order to resolve any presuppositions in . 25 We h a ve decided to code the preferences (binding over accommodation, etc.) into the algorithm itself. This choice is not forced upon us, it is just more e cient than calculating all possible resolutions, and order them afterwards. V : T is informative in the context of ; if it is not the case that there is an E such that ;`E :T (i.e., T does not follow from ; already). A sequence of introductions is informative i f i t c o n tains an informative i n troduction. Notice that adequacy is tested w.r.t. to C while the presupposition is added to ;. This is done to capture the`sub-DRSs clause' of Van der Sandt (1992: 367 (iii) ). Notice moreover, that Van der Sandt's trapping-condition (which states that no variable may end up being free after resolution) is encoded in the CTT framework itself: a v ariable cannot occur in a context where its type is not declared.
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Since may consist of a numberofintroductions a1 :b1 : : : a n :bn we u s e an abbreviation here. For instance: g : ( x : entity p : car x] ) a1 : entity a2 : motor a1]) is an abbreviation of g1 : ( x : entity p : car x] ) entity) and g2 : ( x:entity p:car x] ) (motor g1 x p)).
